Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 4
SYMPOSIUM:
Corporate Misbehavior by Elite Decision-Makers:
Perspectives from Law and Society Psychology

2005

The Social Nature of Boards
Rakesh Khurana
Katharina Pick

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Rakesh Khurana & Katharina Pick, The Social Nature of Boards, 70 Brook. L. Rev. (2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol70/iss4/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Article 6

4/12/2005 6:33:47 PM

The Social Nature of Boards

*

Rakesh Khurana†
Katharina Pick‡
I.

INTRODUCTION

Still reeling from a series of high-profile and extremely
costly corporate scandals involving dysfunctional board
behavior, lawmakers and scholars are scrambling to make
sense of the gaps in understanding that clearly exist in
governance research. Inevitably, these scandals provoked a
surfeit of Monday-morning quarterback explanations. Some
argued that these problems should have been anticipated as
the inevitable consequence of the proliferation of high-powered
pay-for-performance plans.1 Others talked about investors’
misplaced faith in a firm’s stock price as an indicator of
corporate governance quality.2 Ironically, the same fields of
finance and law that are now offering these retrospective
judgments previously advocated increased stock option grants
and an unyielding faith in the efficiency of the stock market.3

*
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1
See L.A. BEBCHUK & J.M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 159-62 (2004).
2
See Michael C. Jensen et al., Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We
Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them (2004) 15-21 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=561305.
3
See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and
Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders, 31 J.
†
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As well-intentioned and wise as many of these
judgments are, we cannot help but feel that they perpetuate a
false understanding as to the nature of boards. At the root of
this finance and law perspective is the assumption that
directors are fully motivated to act in the interests of the firm
and its shareholders only when they have an individual
interest to do so. Advocates of this perspective have argued, for
example, that without financial inducements such as stock
options or share grants, directors “have little incentive to
extend themselves beyond relatively superficial oversight of
their firms’ affairs. They mechanically fulfill their specified
duties (certain approvals and audits) and watch for egregious
derailments, but not much more.”4 Much of the corporate
governance research and prescription of the last twenty or
more years is rooted in this individualistic explanation of board
and director behavior.5
We believe that the dominating focus on individual
director incentives in governance scholarship misses a critical
element of director behavior. As we will argue in this paper, a
board is not a simple aggregation of individuals but is, in fact, a
complex social system and must be understood as such.
Financial considerations do not figure centrally in shaping a
director’s behavior, particularly as it relates to boardroom
culture. In fact, directors are highly cognizant of their
membership, not only on a particular board, but also as
members of a broader community.6 They have a clear sense of
their own boundaries—how far their territory extends, who
belongs, and who does not. The actions of a board, therefore,
cannot be understood as being the aggregate product of each
individual director’s behavior. Rather, their actions express the
sum of connections and relationships of a group.
We know from decades of research on groups that they
are enormously powerful social environments.7 Group
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 377 (1996); M.C. Jensen & K.J. Murphy, Performance
Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990).
4
Donald C. Hambrick & Eric M. Jackson, Outside Directors With a Stake:
The Linchpin In Improving Governance, 43 CAL. MGMT. REV. 108, 110 (2000).
5
See generally Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The
Determinants of Board Composition, 19 RAND J. OF ECON. 589 (1988).
6
See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE
IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOS 82-91 (2002). See generally MICHAEL
USEEM, THE INNER CIRCLE (1984).
7
For a review, see J. Richard Hackman, Group Influences on Individuals in
Organizations, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 199
(M.D. Dunette & L.M. Hough eds., 1992).
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influences on individuals, as well as factors that emerge purely
at the group level and through the group’s situation in a wider
social context shape members’ behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes.
Our argument is that in order to understand the factors
contributing to board culture and board outcomes—whether
dysfunctional or functional—we must treat boards as complex
social systems, and use the group as the basic unit of analysis
when we study them. We must understand both the factors
that are driven by group dynamics and culture and those that
result from environmental influences on the board.
We acknowledge that several organizational scholars
have indeed already approached boards as social systems,
bringing a behavioral perspective to boards research. Lorsch
and MacIver produced one of the earliest qualitative studies of
directors describing the subtle mechanisms shaping behavior
in board rooms and how the resulting conditions can yield both
active and passive boards.8 William Ocasio explored how
institutionalized action shapes board outcomes in CEO
succession.9 Edward Zajac and James Westphal collaborated on
several studies exploring how power dynamics, interlocks,
director reputation, and demography shape board outcomes.10
Mark Mizruchi studied the power relations between boards of
directors and management to explain how these manifested
themselves in control over corporations.11 Finally, network
studies conducted by Gerald Davis among others revealed how
the interlocked nature of the director community shapes the
diffusion of ideas and practices among boards.12
Recognizing these important contributions, our aim here
is simply to call attention to some of the significant ways in
which boards function as social systems, and more specifically
8

See generally JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR
POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS (1989).
9
See William Ocasio, Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance:
The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 384, 389 (1999).
10
See generally Edward J. Zajac & James D. Westphal, Director Reputation,
CEO-Board Power, and the Dynamics of Board Interlocks, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 507 (1996);
Edward J. Zajac & James D. Westphal, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power,
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60 (1995).
11
See Mark S. Mizruchi, Who Controls Whom? An Examination of the
Relation between Management and Board of Directors in Large American Corporations,
8 THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 426 (1983).
12
See Gerald F. Davis & Henrich R. Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and
Governance Changes in the 1980s, 103 AM. J. OF SOC. 1, 12-14 (1997). See generally
Gerald F. Davis, Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the
Intercorporate Networks, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 583 (1991).
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as groups. Because it is a review piece, our paper benefits from
the flexibility to incorporate examples from recent corporate
governance scandals, drawing together theory and practice.
We begin in Part II with a brief review and critique of
agency theory, the dominant theoretical approach that now
underlies corporate governance research in both finance and
law. Because we find these individualistic conceptualizations
problematic, in Part III we look outside the economic and legal
literature and incorporate some of the tools developed in
organization theory that explain board behavior. We apply
these theoretical tools to some of the better-known cases of
corporate malfeasance. Finally, in Part IV we discuss the
implications of this approach for the future of governance
research, particularly in light of recent environmental factors
that now affect corporate boards.
II.

AGENCY THEORY

A.

What is Agency Theory?

More than any other approach, agency theory has
focused on board room dynamics and the fundamental nature
of the factors driving director behavior. Although this approach
has spawned hundreds of articles and its conceptual language
is now widely used by scholars and practitioners alike, our
purpose here is to explore only two of its key assumptions
regarding
director
behavior.
First,
agency
theory
conceptualizes the etiology of director behavior at the
individual level. Second, even when an agency perspective
considers the board as a unit, boards are treated as mere
aggregations of individual director behavior as opposed to
complex social groups.
In the United States, all large public companies have a
board of directors that is approved by the shareholders.13
Legally, the board of directors is vested with enormous
decision-making power over the activities of the company. In
large companies, directors often delegate decision-making to
corporate executives. Even when such delegation occurs,
however, the ultimate power rests with directors. Almost all
existing governance theory produced by economists, which has
13

See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
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had the dominant influence on law, defines the relationship
between directors and shareholders as one instance of an
agency relationship.14 The firm itself is described as a legal
fiction that serves as a nexus of individual contracts.15
This definition of the firm is critical to agency theory
because it suggests the relationship between individuals and
the firm is fundamentally a contractual one. An agency
relationship is thus a contract under which one or more
principal(s) (e.g., shareholders) engage an agent (e.g., directors)
to perform some service on their behalf by delegating some
decision-making authority to the agent. Because directors and
shareholders are unique individuals, it is hypothesized that
their respective interests will diverge. Consequently,
shareholders will take the necessary means to ensure that
directors will act in ways concomitant with their interests.
Much of the research in this area involves identifying the
means, and the efficacy of those means, by which this
convergence of interests is achieved.
This research has translated into many individualoriented reforms. Boards have adopted partial stock option
compensation for directors in order to align directors’ interests
with
those
of
shareholders.
Director
independence
requirements have been formulated primarily with regard to
preventing individual directors from having conflicts of
interest. Qualifications for committee membership, and audit
committee membership in particular, have become clearer and
more demanding so as to ensure that individuals possess the
expertise and knowledge required for the position.
B.

Why Agency Theory is Problematic

Is it realistic or useful to view the modern corporate
board as comprising only, or even principally, a set of
individual contracts? We think not, and we argue that the
radical individualism embedded in this contractualist view is
unreasonable. It blinds us to most of those features of modern
boards that are distinctive and in accordance with directors’

14

See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976); Michael C. Jensen, The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of
internal control systems, 48 J. FIN. 831 (1993).
15
See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14.
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own empirical experiences.16 For example, R.C. Clark notes that
most of the particular rules that make up the relationships
among corporate officers, directors, and stockholders—that is,
the relationships that give operational meaning to the concept
of the corporation—are not the products of individual
contracts.17
Some readers may concede that while a large firm is not
a nexus of individual contracts in a strict definitional sense, the
distinction is insignificant given that we can still analyze
boards or firms usefully as if there were actual contracts in
action. We believe such a response is inadequate. Viewing the
board as an instance of individual contracting may have at
least two objections. First, this individualistic and
undersocialized view of boards, while consistent with agency
theory and economic explanations of human behavior, has
proven to be inadequate when evaluated vis-à-vis the autopsies
of recent corporate misconduct. Moreover, it does not reflect the
real nature of board behavior. Second, academic research could
help a great deal in improving corporate governance, but a
narrow individualistic approach may make it difficult to realize
this potential contribution. Answering the question of how we
are to understand directors’ behavior in boardrooms requires
not only locating the etiology of their behavior, but also
developing defensible premises about director behavior that
can guide theory building and focus empirical investigation. As
Jeffrey Pfeffer and his colleagues have noted, assumptions
about human behavior tend to become self-fulfilling:
To the extent people believe in a particular theory, they may create
institutional arrangements based on the theory that thereby bring
the theory into reality through these practices and institutional
structures. To the extent people hold a theory as true, they will act
on the basis of the theory and expect others to act on that basis also,
creating a normative environment in which it becomes difficult to
not behave on the basis of the theory because to do so would violate
some implicit or explicit expectations for behavior. And to the extent
that people adhere to a theory and therefore use language derived
from and consistent with the theory, the theory can become true
because language primes both what we see and how we apprehend

16

See generally COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING
BOARD: DESIGNING CORPORATE BOARDS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (2004); LORSCH &
MACIVER, supra note 8.
17
See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 60 (R. Zeckhauser ed., 1985).
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the world around us, so that talking using the terminology of a
particular theory also makes the theory become true.18

In the next section we call attention to some of the
important ways in which board outcomes may be shaped by
mechanisms that operate within groups. Specifically, we will
highlight the importance of group norms on individual director
behavior, the effect of social influence on the way directors
interpret information, the effect of group membership on
directors’ attitudes, and finally the potential effect of habitual
routines that develop at the group level and compromise
mindful group decision-making. While these group mechanisms
will be familiar to students of organizational theory, they have
yet to penetrate the dominant law and economic perspective
that continues to inform corporate governance research and
legislation. Indeed, even within organizational research, many
concepts specific to group behavior have not been applied to
work on governance and boards of directors.
III.

BOARDS AS SOCIAL GROUPS

Social influence in groups and through groups is
extremely powerful in shaping the behavior of both members
and non-members. A group environment influences how people
behave, what they believe, and how they feel.19 The board
environment is no different. Despite meeting episodically and
infrequently, boards are groups in a truly psychological and
sociological sense. Boards have clear boundaries, with
membership that is stable over time and readily identifiable by
both members and non-members. A board’s members are
engaged in a common task that requires sharing information
and making joint decisions, and this task is ongoing and does
not end when the board is not in session. Finally, directors
interact face to face at least part of the time.20

18

See Fabrizio Ferraro et al., Economic Language and Assumptions: How
Theories Can Become Self-Fulfilling, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
19
See Hackman, supra note 7, at 1.
20
See J. RICHARD HACKMAN, LEADING TEAMS: SETTING THE STAGE FOR GREAT
PERFORMANCES 41-59 (2002) (discussing the essential features of teams in the work
setting); Donald C. Hambrick, Top Management Groups: A Conceptual Integration and
Reconsideration of the “Team” Label, 16 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 171, 188-89
(1994).
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Board Cohesiveness

Importantly, boards have several characteristics that
make them highly cohesive groups. This is crucial because, as
social psychologists have long recognized, social influence of the
kind that we will be discussing throughout the remainder of
this paper is stronger in groups that are cohesive.21
First, boards are cohesive because they tend to be very
homogenous. Although this is beginning to change with respect
to gender and race, boards continue to be homogenous with
respect to age, occupation, class, and status position.22 This
gives boards the likelihood of shared mental models, attitudes,
beliefs, and experiences that contribute to group cohesion.
Second, boards have high group distinctiveness,
meaning that their membership is readily identifiable both to
insiders and outsiders. Even when not face to face, the group
membership is almost constantly salient given their names are
often listed on websites and company documents and because
the title “IBM Board of Directors” is synonymous with the list
of names that comprise it. Contributing to the distinctiveness
is the fact that membership requirements and tenures are
clearly spelled out and that membership is stable. Indeed, it is
rare that someone is expelled from the group.
Finally, boards are small, ranging from ten to twelve
directors. This makes them small enough for directors and
interactions to be highly visible. Anonymous action is nearly
impossible, and directors are aware of each other both as
directors and as individuals.
Cohesive groups, like boards, have the potential to
realize benefits from diversity of ideas, skills and expertise,
and to make process gains by operating more efficiently.
However, they also have the potential for incurring costs and
process losses.23 The gains and losses associated with group
behavior are inherent in the very nature of boards, and must
therefore be addressed in any explanation of board outcomes.

21

See generally Leonard Berkowitz, Group Standards, Cohesiveness, and
Productivity, 7 HUM. REL. 509 (1954); Hackman, supra note 7, at 252; Stanley
Schachter et al., An Experimental Study of Cohesiveness and Productivity, 4 HUM. REL.
229 (1951).
22
See KHURANA, supra note 6, at 84.
23
See HACKMAN, supra note 20, at 169-75. See generally Norman R.F. Maier,
Assets and Liabilities in Group Problem Solving: The Need for an Integrative Function,
74 PSYCHOL. REV. 239 (1967).
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In a recent Wall Street Journal article, Useem
reiterated what many governance scholars have suggested
before: although they are important, individual flaws like lack
of expertise, prolonged tenure, and conflicts of interest (not to
mention board level problems like inappropriate committee
structures that governance critics like to harp on) will always
be trumped by what ultimately happens when directors meet
behind closed doors and are confronted with important
decisions.24 What transpires there and over the course of
meetings and telephone conversations cannot be reduced to
individual or structural characteristics, but rather must be
understood as the result of complex relationships of the board
as a group.
B.

How Groups Regulate and Shape Behavior

Reflecting on board decisions gone awry, it is always
striking that individual directors were able to sit by and not
pursue issues that later turned out to be consequential. The
board at Hollinger International Inc.25 approved more than half
of the $400 million worth of transactions that Lord Black and
his colleagues improperly pulled from the company. They made
these decisions in infrequent meetings that were described as
“brief, casual affairs,” some lasting no longer than an hour and
a half. The board adopted behavioral routines like rapidly
shuffling through and approving Lord Black’s proposed
transactions, discussing unrelated and trivial but intellectual
affairs during lunch breaks, and allowing Black to dominate
and flatter directors into acquiescence.26
These norms, and the behavior they created, came back
to haunt the Hollinger board. Though Lord Black and his
24

Michael Useem, Behind Closed Doors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2003, at B2.
Hollinger International Inc., an international media conglomerate with
ownership over publications like The Chicago Sun-Times, The Jerusalem Post, and
formerly London’s Daily Telegraph newspaper, was recently the subject of an
investigation and report that dubbed the company “A Corporate Kleptocracy.” CEO
Conrad Black and other controlling shareholders are accused of funneling $400 million
of company money, approximately 92.5% of its entire adjusted net profits between 1997
and 2003, to a handful of top executives and shareholders through activities like
creating bogus payments, self-dealing, and handing out excessive management fees
and perks. See Barbara Shecter & Wojtek Dabrowski, “A Corporate Kleptocracy”:
Black’s Ravelston Corp. Says Report on Hollinger “Laced with Outright Lies”, NAT’L
POST (Sept. 1, 2004), available at http://www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/
news/story.html?id=f8cb6866-da43-4f3a-bf50-4852a795aa6b.
26
See Robert Frank & Elena Cherney, Paper Tigers: Lord Black’s Board,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2004, at A1.
25
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colleagues also consistently misled and lied to the board, the
board passively accepted a process that prevented judicious
oversight—a critical failure. The Hollinger board’s practices
seem negligent in the extreme. But less obviously harmful
behavioral patterns with potentially similar consequences exist
on all boards.
Social norms, particularly in groups, are one of the most
powerful forms of social control over people.27 Directors, like all
members of groups, rely on norms as social indicators of what
behaviors are, or are not, appropriate within the group context.
Particularly within cohesive groups, which the Hollinger board
had all signs of being, such norms are extremely difficult to
challenge. As investigators discovered, Lord Black displayed
consistent and profound loyalty toward his directors, offering
generous donations to charities they supported, and often
flattering them not only with perks but also with personal
compliments.28 Having hand-picked the entire board, it was not
difficult for him to mold the individuals into a group for whom
the norm was to trust management, feel privileged by their
membership among such an elite group, and not insult each
other or waste valuable time with caution and skepticism.
Groups tend to create norms around behaviors that they
consider to be important to effective group functioning and
performance.29 On boards these behaviors are likely to include
the content and flow of board discussions, the sharing of air
time among directors and with management, the leadership
and power balance on the board, the effective use of
information, the proper availability and use of expertise, and
the structure of meetings. It appears that the Hollinger board,
for example, had developed a norm of brevity and cursoriness
that likely undermined each individual director’s freedom to
interrupt or hold up discussion no matter what the reason.
Other boards with which we are familiar have norms governing
the interruption of management presentations, or the
appropriateness of asking questions in the last half hour of a
meeting. Still others have norms regarding director
participation; some discourage full-board discussions while
others require each director to provide an opinion on any given
topic of discussion.
27

See generally GEORGE C. HOMANS, THE HUMAN GROUP (1950); MAZAFER
SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS (1936).
28
See generally Frank & Cherney, supra note 26.
29
See Hackman, supra note 7, at 235-36.
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Whatever their nature, norms are extremely resilient
once they have become established. Groups reinforce norms
through sanctions and feedback to members who violate them.
Ambient stimuli, the back-drop characteristics of the board’s
surroundings and interactions (for example, how directors and
the CEO are situated in the board room, what the board room
looks like, and how directors speak to one another at a
meeting) create a subtle but powerful normative inertia.30 In
fact, ambient stimuli are often more powerful than the
discretionary stimuli because they are “rarely noticed or
discussed.”31 Instead, they function through directors’ implicit
assumptions about what is appropriate based on the cues
provided by the environment.
If a group environment is characterized by formality,
with directors sitting stiffly around a conference table and
interacting only in formal language at predetermined times, a
director with an important but loosely formulated idea would
be unlikely to present that idea because he could not do so in a
sufficiently coherent and formal fashion. Note that his
withholding of the idea may be based on his perception of what
behavior is appropriate or desirable, however, and not
necessarily on any real evidence about what is appropriate.
Unfortunately, this may often prevent ideas and processes that
would be beneficial to groups from surfacing and becoming part
of the group norms. Instead existing norms are supported and
perpetuated since members are more inclined to surface
perceptions through behaviors from which they expect positive
feedback. Members are unlikely to test behaviors that they
think may yield negative responses. Thus individual members
can quietly hold false assumptions about the group that cannot
be revised because no real information is ever exchanged.32
One director’s recent comments reflect the impact even
assumed norms can have on board room behavior:
One of the good things, for all the unpleasantness associated with
the post-Enron period, it is true that boards are much more assertive
than they used to be. And it’s sort of like a natural change, they have
to be, but they don’t have to do anything unclublike in order to be

30

See HOMANS, supra note 27, at 88-94. See generally Lester Coch & John
R.P. French, Overcoming Resistance to Change, 1 HUM. REL. 512 (1948).
31
Hackman, supra note 7, at 209.
32
Chris Argyris, The Incompleteness of Social-Psychological Theory:
Examples from Small Group, Cognitive Consistency, and Attribution Research, 24 AM.
PSYCHOL. 893, 894-99 (1969).
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that way. So that’s a good outcome. It’s expected, you know they’ve
got to ask tough questions and expect answers. It’s hard to describe
precisely, but back prior to this period and certainly in periods in our
history, you really had to kind of stick your neck out if you were
going to really object, even if there were good substantial reasons for
doing it. It’s just that the norms were such.33

By pointing to how external scrutiny has legitimated
directors’ asking of tough questions, these comments highlight
the extent to which being assertive in the boardroom can be
perceived as undermining the board as a group or “club.”
External influences, like those that resulted from recent
corporate scandals, do not always occur and thus do not alter
directors’ perceptions and experiences of norms. Absent these
types of influences, norms usually persist over long periods of
time.
C.

Transmitting and Sustaining Norms

The norms developed in groups are not only stable over
time, but often survive even membership turnover. Unless
there is a shock to the group, either in the form of individuals
deviating from the norm or a change induced by an external
investigation, norms survive even as the composition of the
group changes. This resilience is the result of a number of
important factors, some of which are reinforced by
characteristics specific to boards.
First, board membership usually changes incrementally,
with no more than two or three new directors joining at a time.
Second, new and inexperienced directors who have not been
socialized into board culture and thus learn the behaviors
befitting a board member primarily from those around them.
One now very prolific director described his early board
experience in the following way:
When I first started going on boards I was the youngest thing in the
board room. And so it was very helpful to me to talk to experienced
directors. You know when I first started going to board meetings I
wouldn’t say anything. And obviously I’d listen to the conversation.
Because my mother always taught me to . . . if you go to a big dinner
and there’s a lot of silverware and a lot of crystal and you don’t know
33

Katharina Pick, The Adoption and Framing of a Corporate Governance
Innovation: How Directors Make Sense of the Lead Director Position (2004)
(unpublished Ph.D. qualifying paper, Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences)
(on file with author). All quotes from directors in this article are from directors of
Fortune 500 companies to whom confidentiality was assured.
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which one to pick up, just watch the hostess. So I spent my early
meetings watching. And that’s a way to learn. And then you think “I
would like to ask this question.” And then you see some guy who’s
been there a long time who’s very smart and he asks the same
question that you were thinking about. And that’s helpful to you. So
that gives you some sense of confidence that you’re not exactly
stupid. And then you hear a question that you really think is stupid
and then at lunch some director will tell you “Wasn’t that a stupid
question?”34

Finally, because boards are so homogenously comprised
of elites, the primary way in which people achieve status on a
board is through tenure. This means that the people most able
and likely to challenge norms (i.e., people of high status within
the group),35 are the people who have been there the longest
and are likely the most entrenched in the board’s norms.
In order to explore the nuances and consequences of
norms we must first understand why they are so important to
groups. The enduring norms of a group are functional in
sustaining two critical features of groups: the diversification of
roles within the group36 and the achievement of uniformity in
the group.37 Although these can appear to be contradictory
forces, they are both critical to how groups achieve
organization, order, and predictability in a way that maintains
the group. However, both the tendency toward diversification
and the tendency toward uniformity also have importance
consequences for behavior in groups.
1. Role Diversification
Diversity comes in the form of role differentiation,
which is clearly visible in the formal structure of boards. Here,
committees and committee chairs take on additional duties
with respect to specific areas of expertise. This role
differentiation is also reflected in a board’s informal structure.
A recent study on Lead Directors showed that even where
34

All quotes from directors in this article are from directors of Fortune 500
companies to whom confidentiality was assured.
35
See generally O.J. Harvey & Conrad Consalvi, Status and Conformity to
Pressures in Informal Groups, 60 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 182 (1960).
36
See Harold Guetzkow, Differentiation of Roles in Task-Oriented Groups, in
GROUP DYNAMICS: RESEARCH AND THEORY 683-704 (Dorwin Cartwright & Alvin
Zander eds., 1960); Hackman, supra note 7, at 215.
37
See Leon Festinger, Informal Social Communication, 57 PSYCHOL. REV.
271, 272-73 (1950); Charlan J. Nemeth & Barry M. Staw, The Tradeoffs of Social
Control and Innovation in Groups and Organizations, in 22 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1989).
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boards had not formally named a person to serve as Lead
Director, there were individuals on the board who, in times of
crisis or indecision, would be expected to assume responsibility
or speak up on behalf of everyone else. Directors in most
situations were confident that they could identify that person
and that their selection would be consistent with the
expectations of others. It is not surprising that many boards
should have such informal role differentiation given their
structure, where the independent directors usually have no
formal leader with the exception of the CEO, whom the board
is essentially evaluating. In these conditions an informal
leadership structure is almost certain to emerge.
Subtle role differentiation can become problematic,
however, because when that particular person does not speak
up, it is less likely that others will, even if they feel uneasy
about an issue. This is generally the case because: (1) the
unwillingness of the person to speak up establishes, informally,
that concern is not required; and (2) it feels inappropriate to
violate the implicit roles that have been established. This
dynamic undermines the true function of boards of directors,
which is to allow an opportunity for individuals with different
ideas to come together and share information. In effect, group
dynamics undercut the positive effects of diversity.
2. Achievement of Uniformity
Another reason groups develop norms, and one reason
they are so resilient and consequential to particular outcomes,
is because groups have a tendency toward uniformity.38 Norms,
by bringing individual members together into a behavioral
pattern, are one means through which uniformity is created in
groups.
On one hand, uniformity can be beneficial to groups. It
produces order and predictability as well as a sense of harmony
that enables the group to move toward its goals.39 It can
prevent too much individualistic behavior from undermining
productive discussions and make the group easier to maintain,
for example when everyone in the group has bought into a
common set of principles.40
38

See Festinger, supra note 37, at 272-73; Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at

39

See Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 189.
See Hackman, supra note 7, at 214.

176-89.
40
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On the other hand, pressures toward uniformity also
undermine the group’s willingness (and ability) to recognize
and adapt to changing circumstances.41 In fact, we argue below
that pressures toward uniformity actually can negatively
impact board performance on a number of different levels.
D.

Influences on Group Beliefs

A popular criticism leveled by legislators and scholars
against boards involved in recent corporate scandals is that
they did not have the courage or the conviction to challenge
senior management and/or the CEO on important issues. In
fact, some have accused directors of being “indifferent”.42 While
some directors, no doubt, have been indifferent, this sweeping
generalization overlooks the enormous pressures toward
conformity in group environments. Groups have a strong
tendency to conform around ideas and specifically to
congregate around those held by a majority within the group,
often relying on consensus to signify accuracy.43 Boards are
subject to the same conformity pressures.
Observers say that even a lone dissenter can make a big
difference in the board room. Bill George, former CEO and
Chairman of the Board of Medtronic Inc., a leading medical
technology company headquartered in Minneapolis, recently
cited an instance in which all but one director on his board
approved of a proposed acquisition. That one director
telephoned George after the meeting had ended and made such
a convincing argument for his position that George reconvened
the board by telephone and together the directors decided to
reverse their initial approval. According to George, the board
eventually made the right decision.44 Unfortunately, social
psychological research suggests that such persistence on the
part of an individual member, and such deliberation and
reassessment on the part of a group, are rare. In fact, studies
show that, unless addressed deliberately through appropriate
norms, the structure of group relations simply does not

41

See Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 190. See generally Irving L. Janis,
Groupthink, 5 PSYCHOL. TODAY 43 (1971).
42
See Useem, supra note 24.
43
See Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 189.
44
Carol Hymowitz, In the Lead: Building a Board That’s Independent, Strong
and Effective, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2002, at B1.
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encourage dissent and does not enable groups to handle it
productively when it does occur.45
1. Conformity
There are two types of influence that generate
conformity: normative influence, which happens when people
try to gain approval by conforming to group expectations, and
informational influence, which happens when people accept
information from other people as “evidence about reality” and
thus conform to their view.46
The power of conformity via these two mechanisms is
best demonstrated in a classic study by Solomon Asch in which
subjects were asked to match the length of one line to “one of
three obviously unequal lines.”47 Each subject was situated in a
group of eight with seven confederates who each, when asked
to state their answer aloud, provided the same incorrect
answer.
One third of the time, subjects responded in agreement
with the confederates, providing the incorrect answer despite
the fact that the correct answer was plainly obvious. When
interviewed after the study, subjects provided three different
explanations for their incorrect choices. Some said they were
truly unaware that their estimates were distorted by the
majority. Others said that the majority seeing it differently led
them to doubt their own assessment and change their answer.
Finally, some said they knew their own perception was correct
but did not want to “appear different from or inferior to others.”
Subsequent conformity studies have produced similar results.
One striking nuance to the results is that the judgments
groups converged around often tended to persist in people’s
individual judgments even outside of the group setting.48
Although we like to think of board members as highly
experienced, independent, and empowered individuals, as
45

See Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 185-89.
See id. at 183. See generally SHERIF, supra note 27; Soloman E. Asch,
Effects of Group Pressures Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in
GROUPS, LEADERSHIP, AND MEN (Harold Guetzkow ed., 1951); Morton Deutsch &
Harold Gerard, A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences On
Individual Judgment, 51 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629 (1955).
47
See generally Asch, supra note 46.
48
See Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and
Distortion of Judgments, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 178-79 (Eleanor E.
Maccoby et al. eds., 1958).
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members of groups they are susceptible to the same pressures
toward conformity that all group members are. Moreover, there
are some features of boards that render members particularly
susceptible to conformist behavior. Research shows that there
are several conditions under which informational influence can
be very powerful.
First, members of groups are more likely to rely on each
other in shaping their beliefs when the group’s environment or
the stimulus for the group task is highly ambiguous.49
Certainly, most situations directors face are highly ambiguous.
The issues they confront are usually complex and subject to
interpretation. They rarely face an objective reality and clarity
regarding outcomes and costs. Instead, decisions they make
require judgment about tradeoffs required to achieve various
outcomes and often must be based on incomplete, complex, and
subjective information. Moreover, directors must make these
decisions while being conscious of the fact that they must
answer to shareholders, even when it is not clear whether or
not short-term tradeoffs will benefit those shareholders and/or
the company in the long run. This ambiguity is even more
pronounced in the tumultuous post-Sarbanes-Oxley and postEnron environment where directors are adjusting to new
regulations, making sense of changing expectations, and are, in
some sense, being cast in a newly conceived role that is more
scrutinized than ever before.
The second condition under which informational
influence is particularly powerful is when the relevant group
providing the information is perceived to be credible and
competent.50 Boards are usually made up of very smart, highly
influential, and experienced people. Moreover, directors are
often predisposed to respect those serving on the board with
them, especially when such people are hand picked. Perceived
expertise also plays a major role, as directors are likely to defer
to each other on items where they believe others have greater
expertise.
This relates to the final condition under which
informational conformity is particularly strong: when a person
49

Richard S. Crutchfield, Conformity and Character, 10 AM. PSYCHOL. 191,

193 (1955).
50

See Hackman, supra note 7, at 222. See generally Herbert C. Kelman,
Effects of Success and Failure on “Suggestibility” in the Autokinetic Situation, 45 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 267 (1950); L.A. Rosenberg, Group Size, Prior Experience
and Conformity, 63 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 436, (1961).
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believes him or herself to be relatively unqualified to make a
particular judgment.51 Despite the fact that directors are
generally highly qualified individuals, the flood of information
with which they must work likely leaves them never feeling
completely informed. Directors are often inundated with pages
of information prior to board meetings. Given time constraints,
directors are usually unable to process this information and it
is likely that this could make a director feel as though he or she
is not entirely “qualified” to respond and/or act.
It is worth noting here that some characteristics which
have not received sufficient scholarly attention might also work
to encourage conformity and, thus, undermine the opportunity
for dissent. Boards and board members are highly visible,
despite the confidentiality of what happens in board meetings.
The board has joint accountability and culpability in situations
where the stakes are extremely high, where losses for
shareholders can be in the millions and consequences for
employees can be devastating. In addition, directors are also
highly cognizant of the reputational effects, both within the
director community and outside of that community, of
misguided dissent or of any type of individual interference or
failure in the board room.
2. Suppression of Dissent
It is not just the barrier to dissent that is problematic,
but also what happens once dissent is expressed. Social
psychological research shows a pervasive tendency for groups
to follow the majority position, even when that position is
erroneous,52 highlighting behaviors that the group may use to
bring the views of the minority in line with those of the
majority. These behaviors include increased communication
with a deviant in a group,53 holding the deviant and his or her

51

See generally H.H. Kelley & T.W. Lamb, Certainty of Judgment and
Resistance to Social Influences, 55 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 137 (1957).
52
See Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 183.
53
See generally Leonard Berkowitz & R.C. Howard, Reaction to Opinion
Deviates As Affected by Affiliation Need and Group Interdependence, 22 SOCIOMETRY 81
(1959).
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position in disdain,54 and rejecting or cutting off communication
with the deviant if necessary.55
It is worth noting, however, that minority influence can
be very beneficial to a group, especially when the group is
engaged in non-routine tasks where flexibility of thinking is
important. Some research suggests that “majority influence
causes systematic, but convergent processing of a message,
whereas minority dissent stimulates consideration of an issue
from multiple perspectives, even perspectives beyond what the
minority proposes” in a way that benefits group outcomes
particularly in problem-solving situations.56 Even where
minorities exert some influence, however, it is rarely outwardly
manifested. Members of groups often privately shift their views
in the direction of the minority influence. While such private
reassessment is encouraging, a public shift does not usually
follow57 and thus the group remains under the guise of
consensus and uniformity.
3. The Costs of Conformity
The consequences of this sometimes superficial but
always compelling uniformity are significant. One potential
cost cited by Nemeth and Staw results from the “common
assumption that truth is correlated with consensus.”58 Groups
may stick to a consensus view, even in the face of changing
information, because consensus assures them their assessment
or decision is correct.
This process can lead to an escalating and eventually
self-perpetuating cycle where critical thinking is swept aside by
the momentum the group has developed toward uniformity.
Janis labeled this phenomenon “groupthink,” where the pursuit
of concurrence dominates group process and overrides realistic

54

See Charlan J. Nemeth & Joel Wachtler, Creating Perceptions of
Consistency and Confidence: A Necessary Condition for Minority Influence, 37
SOCIOMETRY, 529, 538-39 (1974).
55
See Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 188. See generally Stanley
Schachter, Deviation, Rejection, and Communication, 46 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 190 (1951).
56
Randal S. Peterson & Charlan J. Nemeth, Focus Versus Flexibility:
Majority and Minority Influence Can Both Improve Performance, 22 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 14, 15 (1996).
57
See Serge Moscovici et al., Influence of a Consistent Minority on the
Responses of a Majority in a Color Perception Task, 32 SOCIOMETRY 365, 373-79 (1969).
58
Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 189.
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and critical thinking.59 In his analysis of the Bay of Pigs “fiasco”
undertaken by President John F. Kennedy and his cabinet,
Janis discovered a group characterized by strong conformity
pressures and self-censorship, direct pressure on members who
dissented, illusions of unanimity, and failure to search for
information or explore alternative courses of action.60 Based on
his observations, Janis suggested that groups like this tended
to rush to judgment, assume invulnerability and morality in
their actions, and make poor decisions.
As mentioned above,61 the effect of conformity pressures
and uniformity in general on group performance is especially
consequential to boards because they are cohesive groups.
Cohesive groups tend to exert more pressure toward even
greater uniformity because members have positive feelings
toward their groups and value the interpersonal rewards they
get from membership. As a result, members usually do not
want to jeopardize these feelings or rewards by dissenting.62
This “affiliation” aspect of the pressure toward uniformity in
cohesive groups highlights another important mechanism by
which groups shape individual behavior—social identity.
E.

Influence on Attitudes via Social Identity

Group memberships comprise an important part of an
individual’s social identity. Studies in social psychology show
that even when the grounds for group membership are
arbitrarily imposed, people often have affective, cognitive, and
behavioral biases in favor of the group and its members.63
Individuals tend to feel more positive about people in the group
than about those on the outside.64 In fact, board members will
often go as far as to believe that other group members are
similar to themselves by virtue of their membership in the

59

Janis, supra note 41, at 440.
See generally Janis, supra note 41.
61
See supra Part III.A.
62
See Hackman, supra note 7, at 252.
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See generally Marilyn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup
Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307 (1979); Richard
Moreland, Social Categorization and the Assimilation of “New” Group Members, 48 J.
PERSONALITY & PSYCHOL. 1173 (1985).
64
See Moreland, supra note 63, at 1173. See generally Jacob M. Rabbie &
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same group.65 Individuals also behave in ways that favor other
group members over outsiders.66 In addition, people tend to
adjust their values and attitudes over time to fall in line with
attitude norms of their membership groups.67 In other words,
group memberships play a significant role in an individual’s
self-definition.
Social psychologists suggest that individuals look to
groups both to maintain a positive self-identity68 and to reduce
subjective uncertainty about self-concept, which includes their
beliefs, behaviors and attitudes.69 The extent to which directors
have similar attitudes about their duties, about the legitimacy
of various accountabilities asserted by external parties, about
what makes an effective group process, and about the group
membership they share, may impact how the board makes
decisions together.
In thinking about group influences on attitudes and
identity we must also consider directors’ memberships in other
groups. Two groups in particular are likely relevant to the
attitudes directors bring to the work they do on boards. First,
in addition to being directors for specific boards, directors are
also members of the wider population of directors. This
population is densely connected through interlocks, with most
directors serving on several boards at the same time.70 The
changing environment for corporate governance has made this
community even tighter as it becomes more bounded by
opposition to external parties that scrutinize and attempt to
exert influence.71 The broader population of directors now has a
visible and distinct out-group, comprised of legislators,
shareholders activists, and various other critics, against which
to position itself.
Directors are also members of groups in their various
professional roles. For example, there is a sub-group within the
65

See Vernon L. Allen & David A. Wilder, Group Categorization and
Attribution of Belief Similarity, 10 SMALL GROUP BEHAV. 73, 79 (1979).
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See generally Vernon L. Allen & David A. Wilder, Categorization, Belief
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(1957).
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Processes in Organizational Contexts, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 121, 123 (2000).
70
See Davis, supra note 12, at 592-98.
71
See infra Part IV.

4/12/2005 6:33:47 PM

1280

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4

population of directors that is comprised of current CEOs.
When this part of a director’s identity becomes salient in the
board context, it is likely to shape his or her behavior in a given
situation.72 Given that a primary function of the board is to
oversee and evaluate the CEO’s performance, this particular
role affiliation may strongly influence the director role.
While economic theory describes directors who are
motivated primarily by the economic incentives of membership,
social psychological research suggests that there are more
important reasons for becoming a board member. In fact, some
corporate governance research suggests most directors join
boards not for money, but rather for the sake of learning from
their peers and contributing their expertise and experience to
the management of other companies.73 Thus, in order to
properly study board outcomes, we must understand not just
the economic incentives of directors, but the benefits and
incentives derived from being part of the group and the broader
director community.
F.

Habitual Routines

A look inside one crucial board meeting at Enron
Corporation, the now bankrupt energy company whose leaders
concocted off-the-books partnerships, twisted accounting rules,
and manipulated the energy market to inflate the company’s
profits and siphon money into their own accounts, shows how
even the most alarming signs of wrongdoing can be missed. On
June 25, 1999, three days prior to their next board meeting,
each director of Enron received a proposal in their fax
machines for suspending the ethics code of the company. CFO
Andy Fastow had asked for the approval of a self-serving
partnership which required the suspension of the code’s
mandate that “even an appearance of an improper transaction
must be avoided” and that “no employee should gain separately
from company service.”74 The subsequent board meeting was
conducted by phone in less than one hour and was “jampacked” with important agenda items and topics requiring the
board’s approval. Directors proceeded expediently through
transactions and proposals and, although no committee had
72

See generally Seymour Lieberman, The Effects of Changes in Roles on the
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vetted the suspension of the ethics code, it was approved by the
group. This decision turned out to be a terrible mistake, as
Fastow went on to add millions to his personal fortune by
exploiting Enron and its shareholders.
Habitual routines, in the terminology of social
psychologists, can undermine the activation of careful and
scrutinizing decision-making in situations like the one just
described. “A habitual routine exists when a group repeatedly
exhibits a functionally similar pattern of behavior in a given
stimulus situation without explicitly selecting it over
alternative ways of behaving.”75 Habitual routines are distinct
from norms because they do not emerge from group
assumptions about appropriateness and their enforcement does
not involve a response to someone who deviates from
expectations. Rather, these behavioral patterns happen to the
group as a whole.
Habitual routines can be both functional and
dysfunctional for any group. First, because they function
automatically in the absence of members’ conscious attention,
they save the group time and energy, particularly in stable
environments. Under such conditions, the group does not have
to actively manage every situation but, rather, automatically
engages in behaviors cued to a particular situation. Because
the group is not actively assessing whether or not its habitual
routine is appropriate in the given circumstance, however, it
always runs the risk of failing to adapt to important changes in
environmental stimuli. Specifically, the group may miscode a
situation and proceed with a particular set of processes that
are inappropriate to the situation and, thus, undermine the
group’s performance.
The 1982 crash of Air Florida Flight 90, as analyzed by
Gersick and Hackman,76 illustrates the disastrous outcomes
that can result when habitual routines govern group behavior.
The data collected from the cockpit voice recorder reveal that
the crew carried out its ordinary takeoff routine, including a
confirmation that the “anti-ice” indicator was “off” despite the
fact that the current weather conditions required that it be on.
The sad irony was that the crew continued to comment as to
the frigid conditions and difficult weather while carrying out
75
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their behavioral routine as if the conditions were dry and
warm. The experiences of Flight 90 show how powerfully a
group can be governed by its routines.
Habitual routines govern a good deal of group behavior
and are likely are vital factor when it comes to explaining
board behavior as well. Perhaps it was reasonable for the
Enron board to expediently approve the agenda items that,
while important, probably resembled transactions they had
discussed countless times before. This time, however, the
directors were approving a suspension of their code of ethics,
certainly not a routine matter and most likely one that was
qualitatively different from anything they had done before.
Because of the board’s habitual routine of disposing of agenda
items, this distinct undertaking was not cued as something
that required a reassessment of how the group would discuss
and process the decision.
Boards have been shaken up by the fallout from recent
oversights like this. Experiencing failure or receiving an
intervention are two of only a few factors that can make
habitual routines salient and make group members aware of a
need to recode certain situations.77 Indeed, even boards not
beset by scandal are becoming aware of the pertinent issues at
hand, and many of them are now reflecting on, and revising,
their own organizational processes.
A prominent director of a Fortune 500 company has
noted how executive session processes can be reconceptualized
when stimulated by new conditions.
[T]his is where collegial process really worked, where somebody
comes up with a thought that maybe is not even a prearranged
thought in the person’s mind, he just says “well you know I’ve been
thinking about this” . . . it sparks a comment from somebody else and
then somebody else and then you come up with something.
Sometimes it’s strategy, sometimes it’s nuance, sometimes it’s
something we don’t like sometimes it’s something we do like.78

Here, the director draws a contrast between an “old
way” and a “new way” of doing things. The routines and
processes directors once adhered to are currently being
reshuffled and being actively shaped, most likely to the benefit
77
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of the process. As the external shock subsides, however,
whatever processes boards adopt will reflect the same tendency
toward routine that usually shapes group behavior.
IV.

BOARDS IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

As we consider the social influences that shape group
behavior and board outcomes from within, we must not forget
that boards are also embedded in a wider, social context—a
complex and increasingly institutionalized environment.
Corporate governance researchers in the 1990s recognized the
importance of this environment to boards but focused primarily
on the role of investors and their interests in driving board
processes and outcomes. Although these issues are important,
we believe there is a more subtle and more powerful
environmental shift affecting boards.
There is no doubt that boards have evolved from being
practically impenetrable groups to being more easily pressured
to adopt certain forms and functions to have legitimacy. In fact,
an increasingly organized environment has, and will, continue
to affect boards through its ability to exercise authority over
how boards should work. It does this by creating a set of
broader norms that are thought to improve governance and
lead to expectations that must be met to establish legitimacy.
Sociologists
would
term
such
an
evolution
the
“institutionalization” of the board, an evolution that certainly
will penetrate the group context of the board and add another
dimension of social influence to those which have been
described above. By institutionalization, we mean a range of
influences, controls, patterns, and tacit understandings that
make up the whole corporate governance field. Institutional
pressures emanate from the relational networks of
organizations that arise in the broader societal context. This
includes many elements beyond the boundaries of any single
board. It includes the consensual notions held by ordinary
investors about what a board ought to be like, how institutional
investors believe board members ought to behave, and the
network of governance rating agencies seeking to influence
board behavior and governance outcomes, among others.
Concretely, the three domains effecting this
institutionalization are the legal, the consultative, and the
educational domains. First, legislators have just completed,
through Sarbanes-Oxley, a prescriptive intervention more
extensive than any that has come before, putting forth new
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independence requirements, stipulating committee structures
and frequency of meetings, and mandating director
qualifications. Many of the recent actions boards have taken
are efforts to demonstrate compliance to new legal standards.
Organizational scholarship suggests that boards can easily go
through the theatre of achieving legal compliance while doing
little to improve the underlying quality of their governance.
Compliance to legal mandates of what defines an independent
director, for example, doesn’t guarantee psychological
independence. The adherence to legal prescriptions does not
necessitate that those principles are manifest in board
behavior. Given the opaque nature of corporate governance
activities, it is fairly easy for boards to adopt the structures
that signal good governance on paper but are, in fact, loosely
coupled to actual board activities. Requiring board committees
to have a written charter does not ensure that directors will
adhere to the spirit and not just the letter of that charter. As
several commentators have noted, Enron’s board was upheld as
a paragon of high quality, independent governance.
The various intermediary institutions that have evolved
with respect to corporate governance have been even more
influential in shaping the language and the expectations
around boards of directors. Ratings agencies scrutinize boards
based on checklists of desirable structures and processes,
implicitly linking conformance to these standards to board
performance. A whole industry has emerged around peddlers of
governance best practices, with scores of consulting firms
opening corporate governance practices and offering both
consulting and training programs to directors. Even the public
relations firms have gotten into the game, recognizing how
important it is for boards to communicate to shareholders and
the media in a way that is in line with best practice and
restores trust. Several PR giants, including WPP Group PLC
and Interpublic Group of Cos. Inc., have devoted business units
to corporate governance.79
Finally, there is an emerging “professional” logic of the
director position. Universities and business schools, in addition
to consulting firms, have seen the need to develop executive
programs for directors. Business schools are making an effort
to include corporate governance courses in their MBA
79
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curriculum. Ethics courses have appeared in response to the
corporate scandals, discussing director roles in corporate
governance outside of explicitly director focused courses. Built
into the educational process itself is a system socializing
students to a particular set of norms, values and dispositions
that are created simply by living in, and responding to,
institutional expectations and the routines of the course work.
As this continues, and as other influences including
auditors and regulators contribute to professionalization, a
stronger set of norms will shape board room behavior. Boards
will be increasingly concerned with, and driven by, concerns for
legitimacy. Thus far, and as evidenced in a recent study on the
adoption of the Lead Director position, directors’ pursuits of
legitimacy have been primarily concerned with the opinions of
other directors on their boards and perhaps those of the wider
population of directors, when it comes to signaling legitimacy.80
As the environment around boards more effectively imposes its
own set of norms, however, the ways in which boards function
as groups will surely change to respond to what is seen as
legitimate in that environment.
We end our essay where we began, calling for a
reconsideration of the dominant law and economics perspective
about the nature of boards. Radical theoretical individualists
will undoubtedly disagree and contend that all corporate
phenomena can be reduced to individual motivation and the
firm to a nexus of individual contracts. But this hypothesis
does not adequately account for corporate behavior today, as
several autopsies of corporate governance failures have
illustrated. We have suggested that there is much to be gained
by examining boards not simply as an aggregation of individual
contracts, but also as a singular social unit. This road may be
more arduous than the dominant perspective. Its research and
study requires a detailed analysis of the social structure of the
board and recognition of the complexity of motivations that
underlie behavior. We believe, however, that this route is more
analytical and empirically defensible than the current theory.
We also believe it opens up tremendous opportunities for new
types of research methods, especially qualitative research that
emphasizes field work and interviews.
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